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Paper Abstract

A Balanced Approach: Thoughts for the Adoption of Mission Command by the Joint Force:
As the US military prepares to face a wide array of current and future threats across multiple domains; adaptability and agility are necessary traits to counteract a globally dispersed enemy. One of the methods to introduce these traits into the joint force while operating in an uncertain environment is mission command. Despite the recent and numerous discussions on mission command this concept is not a new idea. Mission command is a decentralized form of command and control which empowers subordinates to exercise initiative in the absence of orders. Most of the literature regarding mission command pertains to its use by land forces; over ten years of war overwhelmingly fought in the land domain has encouraged that focus. In fact, the US Army adopted mission command within its doctrine some time ago.
Recently, it has been emphasized as a key component of its latest doctrinal revolution: Army Doctrine 2015. However, mission command is not just a concept for land forces. It is a mindset the entire joint force must adopt. In April 2012, General Martin Dempsey, published the Mission Command White Paper. This document establishes the importance of mission command and directs the joint force to adopt its principles to counter threats in a complex operating environment. But while mission command already exists in a limited way within joint doctrine, should joint doctrine adapt the definition of mission command going into the future? Certain approaches to adopting mission command closely link this concept to technological applications and systems. In doing so, does this contradict the philosophical nature of mission command? This paper will analyze current doctrinal approaches to defining mission command comparing them with the origins of this concept to provide thoughts for the joint force as this powerful concept is adopted. As mission command's implementation is realized, joint doctrine must avoid the approach of aligning mission command with technology as this will contradict the philosophical nature of this concept by implying that successful execution of mission command depends on network centric systems and tasks. General Dempsey's white paper on mission command was published the same year.
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
This document notes that the challenges and vulnerabilities associated with operating in a technologically advanced environment necessitate a new outlook on how we operate. 16 As a result, the joint force must utilize the philosophical concepts of mission command to enable success in times of degraded communications while still maintaining the ability to decisively mass combat power. 17 In other words, mission command is the ideal command philosophy for operational level commanders to utilize for countering threats in a complex environment even without the advantage of technology. As mission command is adopted within the joint force how will certain approaches to implementing mission command by different services influence emerging joint doctrine?
Current approaches to defining Mission Command (The US Army):
Of all the services, the Army's adoption of mission command is the most extensive.
In 2011, the Army released Field Manual (FM) 3-0, change 1. One of the most significant changes was the removal of the C2 warfighting function (WFF) in place of mission command. 18 The main argument against C2 is the pervading thought that it is too network 15 FM 6-0, Mission Command, 1-14. 16 Dempsey, "Mission Command White Paper," 3. centric and not commander focused; mission command is felt better suited to address these issues. 19 However, C2 is still a valid concept within current joint doctrine. It is defined as:
the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
20
Hence, C2 gives an operational commander authority and control over assigned or attached forces during the conduct of an operation. Dr. Milan Vego notes that command is the legal authority one executes over assigned forces based on rank and position to direct forces against specific missions. Control allows a commander to synchronize the efforts of subordinates through established limits and a command structure. A commander can execute C2 in either a decentralized or centralized manner depending on one's circumstances.
21
Defined in this manner the concept of C2 is both relevant and valid. Yet, despite its relevance, the Army removed the concept of C2 for reasons of its growing association with micromanagement and network centric capabilities and replaced it with mission command.
Many critics of C2 argue that it is too structured, controlling and prohibits initiative amongst subordinates.
22
Interestingly, another noticeable absence from the Army's current mission command doctrine is the concept of detailed command. Detailed command, in short, is a more centralized form of C2 utilized in certain conditions. As FM 6-0 stated, "in practice no commander relies on purely detailed or purely mission command techniques. leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission." 43 In addition, this publication describes mission command as being an integral part of the C2 function, enabling units to achieve their objectives despite technological degradation. 44 Put another way, the philosophy of mission command enables successful mission accomplishment. Technology is a tool of the commander, but is not required to conduct successful mission command. As it stands now, joint doctrine recognizes mission command's utility on the modern battlefield.
Recently the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff introduced the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO)
. This is a significant document in that it will no doubt shape emerging joint doctrine. Described within the CCJO is the role the joint force will play within the concept of Global Integrated Operations (GIO). GIO is the concept of integrating both joint and other forces across boundaries to integrate capabilities to accomplish objectives in future security environments. Mission command is listed as a key element of GIO.
45
As is stated in the CCJO, mission command must be viewed in the realities of the information age we live in along with the vulnerabilities that technology brings.
46
Furthermore, the increasing capability of digital technology allows commanders to exercise mission command in new ways. 47 The CCJO goes on to say that, despite these advantages, the joint force must not become complacent. Just as the CCJO describes the role technology will play, it also clearly indicates that commanders must prepare to operate in degraded states without the advantage of technology.
By closely aligning mission command with technology, a contradiction of the philosophical nature of this concept emerges and leads to some troubling implications.
Implications of Associating Mission Command with Technology:
As mission command is formally adopted, the joint force must carefully avoid the association that successful mission command relies on technology. commander based on the massive amounts of information they produce thereby tethering a commander to their operations center. The implication here is that a commander assumes risk by leaving a command post to move forward on the battlefield. 52 As a result, new systems such as the "mission command on the move" (MC OTM) have emerged which provide the command technologies and applications to enable commanders to negotiate the battlefield from ground or air platforms to conduct mission command. 53 This implies that mission command requires these technologies for successful execution.
Current trends indicate that mission command is quickly being thought of as technologically dependent and network oriented as opposed to a philosophy based on theory.
There is a danger in this association. As Milan Vego points out, implying that military theory is irrelevant because of the rise of technological platforms is troubling. The human aspect is vitally more important than the technological aspect of winning wars. 54 The philosophy of mission command accounts for the intangibles of human nature.
Technology can provide significant advantages to an operational level commander.
While the ability to communicate across domains is significant, the argument that successful execution of mission command depends on technological platforms has flaws. Some point out that while technology can produce enormous amounts of data and information, these systems do not possess the human qualities which enable rapid, intuitive decisions necessary in war. Shamir, Transforming Command, 139. strike targets at the first sign of trouble. 60 In all fairness, others would disagree with this.
They point out that elements of 3 rd Infantry Division felt empowered to use initiative, seizing terrain beyond what had been directed. The operational commander knew this was happening while watching friendly icons move across a computer screen removed from the battle. To the extent that subordinate commanders felt empowered to continue their maneuver was a result of trust and understanding between the operational and tactical commanders. 61 It was not because of digital systems far removed from the scene of action.
As General Dempsey notes, mission command must be realized in the realities of the technological age in which we operate. That bit of guidance speaks to the importance of balancing the approach to defining mission command.
CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS
Joint doctrine must establish the framework from which operational and joint task force commanders exercise mission command as a form of C2. Taking the approach of establishing mission command as a function to institutionalize this concept leads to contradicting the philosophical nature of this concept. Advocates of network centric warfare will seize the opportunity to align a theoretical concept such as mission command with technological innovations.
Operational level commanders do not require networked applications to effectively conduct mission command. They are powerful tools, which utilized effectively provide advantages, but the idea that reliance on these systems is necessary to conduct mission command is problematic. Effective mission command relies upon the same fundamental, philosophical concepts that enabled initial success for the German Army during WWII. As 60 Ibid., 138. 61 Fontenot, "Mission Command, " 68. some point out, despite superior abilities to communicate and maintain situational awareness, the study of history and commanders successes and failures is vitally more important to the adoption of mission command than the number of information systems at one's disposal.
62
Therefore, the following serves as recommendations for how the joint force should view mission command moving into the future.
First, mission command should be understood as a philosophy of command. While technology plays a role in the way the US military fights wars, the joint force must adhere to the basic tenants of mission command rather than endangering the philosophical nature of this concept by associating it with technology. Mission command is exceedingly more powerful as a philosophical mindset than as a function to replace C2. As mission command pervades joint doctrine and thought, the philosophical aspects of intent, mission orders, initiative, trust, and acceptance of prudent risk must be emphasized for successful execution.
63
In addition, detailed command (or a centralized version of C2) must remain in the doctrinal lexicon. Despite detailed command's removal from current Army doctrine, this concept is still supported by emerging guidance for the joint force. As the CCJO notes, mission command is the preferred command philosophy but might not be appropriate at instance, rather than thinking of mission command as all or nothing, this concept should be thought of as a spectrum; exactly where one falls on this spectrum depends entirely on the specific situation facing that commander. 65 As one author points out, a joint force commander must move between different C2 styles either adopting a more centralized or decentralized style depending on the situation.
66
Finally, joint doctrine must continue to maintain C2 as a joint function and avoid the approach of establishing mission command in its place. The Army should follow suit and reestablish the C2 function. C2 states who has command authority, what command structure is in place and to what degree that commander has control over assigned forces. To the extent that C2 is thought of as too structured, network centric and micro managerial is a fault of the organization. As some argue, control is not a bad thing. Commanders must establish some forms of controls to avoid overconfidence by their subordinates. A system of checks and balances is required. 67 Perhaps even more importantly, control allows a commander to prevent the larger effort from being desynchronized.
Ultimately, however, the operational level commander, within a supporting framework of doctrine, assumes the pivotal role in establishing the conditions for successful execution of mission command as a form of C2. The operational or joint force commander must encourage mission command and not allow the abilities of senior leaders, through technology, to degrade this philosophy. In other words, the operational commander is to 65 Conley, "Operationalizing Mission Command," 34. 66 Shamir, Transforming Command, 18. enable subordinates to do their jobs and prevent interference from strategic level decision makers.
68
In an era where technology allows senior commanders to view subordinates in the conduct of their missions, operational commanders must instill in their subordinates that they have the latitude to act in line with the overall intent, knowing that whatever decision is made is supported. This type of mission command environment will occur because of the guiding principles of mission command, not as a result of technological innovations. 69 As some point out, war is chaotic and dynamic. The role of information technologies will make it more so simply by the amount of information that is generated and shared. The best solution, despite these technological advancements, is to decentralize to those at the point of decision and defer to their judgment.
70
FINAL REMARKS
The associated advantages of technology are critical tools on the modern battlefield, and the intent of this paper is not to imply otherwise. Rather, the intent of this paper is to argue that successful execution of mission command requires leaders to act in the absence of these systems. Aligning mission command too closely with technology contradicts the theoretical nature of this concept. As Clausewitz noted, the information one gathers in war can often be inaccurate. 71 Uncertainty will never be completely reduced; mission command properly understood and in the hands of capable commanders is uniquely suited for this environment. 
